National Air Traffic Control Service - the need to pursue "Absolute Zero"

The National Air Traffic Control Service (NATS) traces its history back to the early days of commercial aviation in the United Kingdom in its pioneering role utilising a rudimentary form of air traffic control based on flag signals. Modern commercial aviation however demands both the use of complex information management systems and highly skilled human labour with the NATS employing just over 2000 air traffic controllers handling 2.2 million flights annually.  To meet this challenge the organisation is “committed to delivering exemplary service performance and, through consultation with our customers, identifying and implementing new standards in service quality”.

National Air Traffic Control Service £623M Swanwick site which serves as the nerve centre for the management of UK airspace has seen its share of teething problems at its inception and software issues during the summer but the 7^th December 2013 witnessed a catastrophic failure of its management systems which Eurocontrol, Europe’s air traffic control monitor, reported "Around 130,000 minutes of delay are currently expected with approximately 1,300 flights (almost 8% of the European traffic today) being severely delayed".

An investigation into the incident revealed that there was a breakdown in the IT systems with "more than a million lines of software" compromised significantly affecting the internal phone network that not only supports interaction between air traffic controllers within the same room but also with regional air traffic control authorities on the European continent. This seemingly straight forward technical issue was blamed on the "difficulty switching from night time to daytime operation" thereby making it impossible to reconfigure voice communication systems which is organised into sectors to cope with the demands of daytime UK airspace traffic.

The inability of NATS to meet its service plan objectives contributed to poor service performance levels with 20% of departures at Gatwick Airport hit by delays and 50% of flights at London City Airport faced disruption.

A cursory review of NATS 10 year business plan reveals a limited emphasis on contingency planning with quality issues shrouded by terms such as efficiency and innovation despite having a quality management system. Unfortunately there has not been a balanced strategic approach to the management of non-financial risk with effort being expounded on safety and emissions reduction to the detriment of the reliability of mission critical information management systems. This was compounded by a failure to test contingency measures or effectively mobilise contingency plans in the event of catastrophic failure.

Increasingly in our technological age firms and nation states are exposed to information risk either through limited access to information, loss of information and inaccurate information that affects not only competiveness but also safety and security. In essence sustainability is now a four legged stool consisting of the economic, ecological, social and information.  Sustainable organisations must combine the goals of "zero errors” and “zero emissions” into the pursuit of the strategic goal of "Absolute Zero" the point at which no more adverse risk can be removed from a system which is a benchmark upon which sustained customer satisfaction can be achieved.

Eurocopter - When Puma's fly

The tragic loss of life arising from the recent crash of a Eurocopter Super Puma AS332 L2 on the 23 August 2013 brings into sharp focus the dangers of North Sea Oil and Gas. This tragedy is personally poignant to me as I served in a Royal Navy search and rescue (SAR) unit based in Scotland that was resourced with ageing but superbly maintained Sea King helicopters.

Herein lies the case for quality – Ageing Design: the original design of the Super Puma came into production in 1981 with a series of product extensions in areas such as avionics, engine and gearbox power to meet the demands of the expanding commercial market. A focus on incremental improvement not continual improvement, to compete Eurocopter must invest an estimated €500m into research and development of a helicopter for civilian transport and search and rescue operations. This ageing theme extends to the Eurocopter helicopter product portfolio with new versions stymied by delays and cost overruns for potential replacements for the Super Puma in the form of the NH90 and Tiger military version helicopters.

Design issues aside the Eurocopter Super Puma and its variants have been involved in five accidents in the North Sea since 2009.

Specifically the Eurocopter Super Puma AS332 L2 has accounted for 20 fatalities in the North Sea over the past five years the worst being an accident occurring in waters off the coast of Peterhead, Scotland in April 2009 resulting in 16 fatalities. The investigation into the accident conducted by the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) concluded gearbox failure that may have been diagnosed if the “metallic particle discovered on the epicyclic chip detector during maintenance on 25 March 2009, some 36 flying hours as an indication of second stage planet gear” failure.

As a result the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) recommended that “Eurocopter, with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), develop and implement an inspection of the internal components of the main rotor gearbox epicyclic module for all AS332 L2 and EC225LP helicopters as a matter of urgency to ensure the continued airworthiness of the main rotor gearbox”.

This recommendation contributed to the introduction of safety Directives by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and new pertinent maintenance guidance by Eurocopter. Surprisingly AAIB investigators highlighted parallels with an earlier accident in 1980 involving a SA330J Puma helicopter indicating a clear absence of a factual approach to decision making – an organisational failure to learn from past events that unfortunately led to deadly consequences. Subsequent two forced landings of albeit variants of the Super Puma led to a UK ban on sea flights which was only lifted in July 2013

Eurocopter the world’s largest commercial helicopter manufacturer saddled with excess inventory, poor cash position and under pressure from agile competitors such as Bell Helicopters, Augusta Westland who are keen to acquire a piece of its market share as energy operators opt for transport firms that use alternative helicopter supplier, may yet face Darwinian extinction if it does not evolve and focus on quality.

Findus - Strategy that lacks beef

Living in the UK I have always ridiculed my North American relatives for living in countries with a perceived "less than stringent" food supply chain. I guess now the "chickens have come home to roost" more aptly put "the horses have bolted out of the stable".

Its no laughing matter for Findus a company that in 2012 was rescued by a £60m purchase of its junior debt by  its shareholder Lion Capital as well as later debt restructuring of £220m that injected £20m in cash on the balance sheet and provided a cushion of a £70m overdraft facility. Analysts speculate that Findus is a victim of the markets with high raw material prices, demands buy its customers for lower prices and evil Eastern European criminal gangs trading in Romanian horse meat all conspiring against its success.

The facts reveal a different story - Findus was purchased by Lion Capital a private equity firm in 2008 for £1.1bn from its rival CapVest with the long term goal to divest at a premium after expanding the business which is currently second in Europe to Birds Eye Iglo. In 2011 under the watch of CEO Chris Britton a former Diageo Group Marketing Director the firm and its shareholder Lion Capital requested that the restrictive covenants preventing the firm's ability to raise capital be relaxed. The financial markets acquiesced, this enabled Findus to raise 1.1bn from lenders which was used to go on an acquisition spree acquiring continental food brands such as Frudesa and Salto a  from the french firm Bonduelle. Yet Chris Britton also aimed to focus the company on its core competencies.

Quality is a competency that has been overlooked in the company's pursuit of growth. In documents disclosed to their supermarket customers the firm admits since August 2012 horse meat may have been used in the production of its frozen Beef Lasagne product. Eagerly blaming suppliers like Comigel for product non conformance. Findus failed to accept its responsibility as a corporate entity to build mutually beneficial supplier arrangements within its supply chain. Also by its own admission the company had not been conducting inspection and testing of incoming products which is indicative of overall poor process management. As a result customer confidence is lost and with it potential market share, saddled by a burden of debt Findus may yet face the lash of fines from UK regulators which will be less severe than the backlash of angry consumers.

This scenario was avoidable if Findus had pursued its a strategy of quality and continuous improvement as own its corporate website states  "you’ll find the most consistent Findus ingredient is quality. A strong commitment to quality has long underpinned the continuing success of the Group and its brands in both the retail and foodservice sectors".
 Its time for Findus and the Food Sector to find the virtue of quality a key ingredient for strategic success...

To learn more about quality, safety and environmental management visit www.sustainabilitycsr.com 

BP's Deepwater Horizon - A Quality issue or a Safety issue?

Its been more that two years since the tragedy of the Deepwater Horizon incident costing the lives of some of its crew,  damage to the environment besides the strain on the lives and livelihoods of individuals living in US states along the Gulf coast.
There appears to be a return to business as usual oil production has improved in the Gulf of Mexico. BP the defendants in this case have moved from "beyond petroleum" to above suspicion recently rewarded by the financial markets with a share price increase for negotiating £4.9 million in damages with victims. Policymakers and the industry have opted for more compliance focused on safety and environmental dimensions of performance which will necessitate the need for more audits and auditors. An uneasy hush has fallen as the incident slowly fades from the headlines and the collective memory of the public. A scenario that seems oddly familiar....

Background

Dr. Tony Hayward was appointed CEO of BP after the less than savory departure of Lord Browne his mentor and predecessor. As CEO he promised to focus on safety "like a laser" knowing full well as a BP insider the spate of safety incidents that occurred prior to his appointment at their Texas city refinery in 2004 - 2005, the near sinking of the Thunder-horse platform in the Gulf of Mexico, oil spill in Alaska in 2006 and US Labor Department  fines for safety violations at its Toledo refinery in 2006.
Tony Hayward a geologist by profession also adopted a strategy of doing more with less by immediately cutting over 5000 jobs  early in his now fateful tenure. This decision to cut jobs may have made an accident like Deepwater Horizon predestined. To his credit he instituted risk management training for executives at BP's "Operations Academy" at MIT and established the company's Operations Management System (OMS) which although innovative now seem painful inadequate.


Quality Failure

The Chartered Quality Institute defines quality management as "an organisation-wide approach to understanding precisely what customers need and consistently delivering accurate solutions within budget, on time and with the minimum loss to society". This inclusive understanding of quality especially minimizing loss to society was not understood by Tony Hayward and BP's senior management. The company cautioned employees against having  uncovered cups of hot beverages but no procedure for the "negative pressure test" critical in terminating drilling operations.
The question may be asked... was the Deepwater Horizon fit for purpose?
 As a drilling platform the Deepwater Horizon was state of the art; built by Hyundai at a cost of $365 million, it was a unique combination of ship and drilling package. Operated by a crew of 160 it was kept relatively motionless when at sea by four metal pontoon legs and GPS positioning systems. At the time of construction its 28000 tonne drilling package set a world record for the heaviest object ever lifted.

Despite state of the art equipment the Deepwater Horizon as with other platforms had an Achilles heel it was the absence of a quality culture within the oil and gas sector which traditionally has been dominated by a risk taking attitude necessary for oil  and gas exploration.

This absence of a quality culture gave rise to the following quality failures leading to the explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon:

1. Incorrect parts - centralizers key equipment used in drilling operations were received from supplier not to specification
2. Breach of existing well design - to little centralizers used in operations 6 instead of 21 -  a casualty of the misdirected focus on reducing cost not reducing the cost of quality
3. No Product verification -  incoming inspection tests were not conducted on the cement foam upon receipt from the supplier Haliburton
4. Poor Supplier Management - cement supplied by Haliburton failed in-house tests. The need to develop mutually beneficial supplier relationships is a corner stone of total quality management and quality management standards such as the ISO 9001. BP's relationship with their supply chain Transocean and Haliburton as events has revealed can be described as combative at best.
5. Poor Process Management - "Negative Pressure Test" was not on the platforms work plan. There was no procedure for conducting the "Negative Pressure Test"
6. No Management of Change Procedure - Negative Pressure Test added to the work plan at the "eleventh hour". This confusion led to the acceptance of one positive test result despite three failed negative pressure tests a decision that sealed the fate of the crew of the Deepwater Horizon.

These 6 quality failures resulted in catastrophic loss of life and environmental disaster- the safety consequence - a cost we can only estimate.

The cost to BP for the absence of a quality culture has been a $91 billion loss of market value between April - June 2010, over 350 lawsuits from the general public, damage to its brand image, loss of support from environmental groups with the US Audubon Society "largest uncontrolled science experiment in our country", shareholder dissatisfaction and loss of industry leadership.

Safety is not the issue it is a lack of an understanding of quality and its impact on the triple bottom-line economic, social and environmental. Its time for BP, the oil and gas industry and regulators to adopt an industry-wide approach that embraces continuous improvement that goes "beyond quality"

The four swans of sustainability

 

On a recent visit to Edinburgh Napier Business School for a meeting with Dr. Ian Smith the sustainability program course leader. I noticed four origami swans on his desk. Upon enquiring further he intimated that the items were found at the end of one of his lectures on the seat vacated by an anonymous student.  Jokingly he suggested it is symbolic of the quality of his lecture which one of his students found origami more interesting!

But why swans?

Swans in mythology have helped Greek gods move across the sky and is considered by many ancient and indigenous peoples to symbolise transformation, balance and elegance. Swans depending on colour e.g. black swans symbolise mystery or uncertainty.

My own research into the phenomenon of sustainbility footprints (i.e. the use of carbon footprint, water footprint, ecological footprint and the emerging concept of social footprints to evaluate the present non-financial consequences and future risk implications of strategic decisions) - indicates Sustainability footprint methodology is at the nexus of three management theories:

·         Risk – sustainability footprint risk must incorporate environmental impact and its effect on cost structure and revenue streams

·         Natural Resource Based View – sustainability footprint measurement contributes to strategy through pollution prevention, product stewardship and sustainable development

·         Shared Value – as indicators sustainability footprint assists firms in the mitigation of environmental impacts arising from value chain activities

These theories reveal four key areas within which sustainability footprints can contribute to the success of the firm in terms of cost dimension, innovation dimension, environmental dimension and stakeholder dimension...... the four swans of sustainability

Results of our pilot case study suggest that sustainability footprints can transform stakeholder perceptions of waste from being a cost centre to a profit centre, reduce carbon emissions by diverting waste from landfill and stimulate innovation through the search for potential energy savings.

Firms that do not measure their carbon, social and water footprint expose themselves to uncertainty and risk especially within the context of climate change as they fail to adopt behaviours or make decisions which are expressly sustainable.

To learn more about quality, safety and environmental management visit www.sustainabilitycsr.com

An uncommon thing about common safety

During the past few months the safety profession in the UK has been challenged to adopt a “common sense approach” to the management of health and safety. Lord Young’s report “Common Sense, Common Safety” focussed mainly in his view on “non hazardous” businesses and occupations such as offices and shops. The interpretation of administrative and point of sale occupations as being “non hazardous” is myopic and fails to grasp the effects of stress on individual well being – the much neglected health side of the health and safety equation. The report sadly has created a perception that safety has spawned its own unique form of bureaucracy which is stifling economic growth and productivity.

Philosophically common sense is defined as “the basic level of practical knowledge and judgment that we all need to help us live in a reasonable and safe way”. This attempt to encapsulate our understanding of this catch all phrase leaves the concept of what is “reasonable and safe” open to interpretation which raises the following key issue:

The understanding of what is “reasonable and safe” is not homogenous within any society.

The inability of ”reasonable” people to unanimously agree on what is safe or even right makes law and best practice a requirement to ensure the safety of individuals civil society. The challenge of the health and safety profession is to expound the uncommon nature of safety by focusing on the need for a careful understanding and management of risk in traditional high risk occupations and sectors such as oil & gas but also in new “green“ jobs such as recycling, an ageing workforce and the rise in obesity giving due regard to the impact of stress on the working, family and social lives of individuals in “non hazardous” occupations. It is this holistic view that practitioners must adopt if the profession is to help its stakeholders make the connection between a healthy, sustainable lifestyles and safety at work which will hopefully cynical myths of ‘elf n safety’.

To learn more about quality, safety and environmental management visit www.sustainabiliycsr.com 

Scotland - A future with Zero Waste?

Image via Wikipedia

Scotland’s devolved government launched an ambitious Zero Waste Plan on 9 June 2010. The Zero Waste Plan aims to achieve waste recycling rates of 70 per cent with 5 per cent of waste going to a municipal landfill by 2025.


The UK has been considered as one of the laggards within the European Union, in terms of its efforts to promote waste recycling. Only two other EU member states – Greece and Portugal – have a worse track record when it comes to recycling waste. In the long term, this exposes Great Britain to the threats of landfill fines imposed by the European Union. In parallel with this, the export of UK waste to China for recycling also reduces opportunities for developing UK-based competency in recycling.
Within this context, the challenge for Scotland appears daunting. Its own track record over the past decade shows that 92 per cent of municipal waste was transferred to landfill during the period 2001/2002, reducing only to 63 per cent in 2008/2009. With a relatively small population size of 5.19m, the Scottish economy generated 20m tonnes of waste in 2008, of which 8.6m tonnes were attributable to construction sector activity. The rest of the commercial sector accounted for 7.6m tonnes of waste, with household consumption contributing 2.9m tonnes of waste.

This situation is exacerbated by the closure of landfill sites on the Shetland Islands and the Hebrides, whose  municipal waste is now pre-treated and used to generate Energy from Waste (EfW) as part of their district heating scheme.

Zero Waste Plan
Scotland’s Zero Waste Plan is influenced by three main drivers:
•The European Union Waste Directive 2008/98/EC. This European wide policy instrument is aimed at developing a “recycling society” within the European Union, whereby waste prevention, recycling and waste recovery options are explored for their environmental and economic feasibility. Landfill disposal is the least preferred option.

•The Climate Change Act (Scotland) 2009. This is an innovative legal instrument binding the Scottish Government to an 80 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, with an interim target of a 42 per cent reduction by 2020. Specifically, Part 5 of the Act requires the Scottish Government to initiate programmes to improve waste reduction. Waste in landfill sites releases hazardous methane gas, contributing to overall greenhouse gas emissions. The Scottish government is keen to apply carbon measurement techniques to help reduce the impact of waste on climate change, in addition to using traditional weight measures which are used to analyse its waste management performance.

•The Courtauld commitment. This is an agreement between government and the retail sector established in 2005 to reduce packaging, increase packaging recyclable content and improve packaging design by participants in the UK retail sector supply chain.

The philosophy behind Scotland’s Zero Waste Plan is rooted in the six steps of the Waste Hierarchy Model proposed in the EU’s Waste Directive (as seen in the box on the previous page).

Articulated in the Zero Waste Plan are initiatives to translate the broad philosophical approach of the Waste Hierarchy model into practical measures which are illustrated in the box below.


To implement its Zero Waste Plan, the Scottish Government is turning to the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and the recently rebranded Zero Waste Scotland (formerly WRAP Scotland). The Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) also provided support to develop Scotland’s Zero Waste Plan. The latter’s role is now in doubt, however, as it has fallen victim to UK government fiscal austerity measures. In the absence of the Commission, it is envisaged that the Scottish Parliament and Audit Scotland will monitor the success of the Zero Waste Plan and the overall development of a sustainable economy in Scotland, although the effectiveness of this proposed arrangement is yet to be demonstrated.
Critical to the success of the Zero Waste Plan is the development of infrastructure to segregate and reduce the contamination of recyclable materials, such as contamination from food waste. This issue can be resolved through an increase in the composting of food waste, and consumer awareness campaigns encouraging individuals to see food waste as an importance resource. According to the Plan, waste materials could contribute 31 per cent of Scotland’s renewable heat target and 4.3 per cent of its renewable electricity target; but in order to make this happen, a shift in public attitudes is vital. Rather than waste being perceived as a liability, or an unavoidable consequence of consumption, it must be seen as an asset.
Waste management infrastructure developments such as aerobic and anaerobic composting sites, Mechanical Biological Treatment (MBT) facilities and Energy from Waste (EfW) schemes require a high level of capital investment, but they can contribute to long term economic growth and job creation. Initial projections indicate Scotland needs investment in waste management infrastructure of £1,046m above current levels, over the next 15 years, if it is to meet EU and Scottish Government waste reduction targets. A possible revenue option could be the redirection of costs incurred from the collection and disposal of waste, amounting to £404m during the period 2007 -2008. The onus is on businesses and households to help achieve this by reducing their own waste.
Improving the awareness of waste as a revenue source and its impact on the environment and human health has been a key programme of Zero Waste Scotland – the body mandated to implement the Scottish Zero Waste Plan. Through its partnerships with local councils and SEPA, Zero Waste Scotland has provided workshops, seminars, as well as consultancy support to encourage both individuals to change their attitudes to waste, and organisations to implement environmental management systems.
A recent waste awareness initiative conducted by Zero Waste Scotland showed the financial cost of cleaning litter on Scottish highways amounts to £100m annually, besides its environmental impact on the Scottish landscape and safety risk implications for litter collectors.

Legal framework
Scotland’s Zero Waste Plan provides business and society with a sustainable approach to development, but an intellectual appeal may not be enough. The Scottish Parliament is also backing up the programme through statutory instruments. The cornerstones of this future legal framework of waste management are found in the following proposed regulations:

Zero Waste Scotland Regulations 2011
Environmental Protection (Duty of Care) (Scotland) Regulations 2011.
•The introduction of the above regulations also necessitates amendments to the existing regulations, including:

•Environmental Protection Act 1990

•Waste Management Licensing Regulations 1994

•Pollution Prevention and Control (Scotland) Regulations 2000

•Landfill (Scotland) Regulations 2003

•Environmental Protection (Duty of Care) Regulations 1999.

•The Zero Waste Scotland Regulations 2011 will enshrine in law five key zero waste management goals:

•A landfill ban on key recyclable materials

•Bans on mixing separately collected recyclable materials

•The segregation, separation and collection of key recyclable materials

•Restrictions on the inputs to energy from waste processes

•A property-based ban on waste disposal of organic content to landfill.

Scotland has chosen to develop its Zero Waste Plan as part of a wider low carbon strategy for economic growth. However, if it is to achieve these waste management targets, and reap the rewards of both economic growth and job creation, it requires investment to upgrade its existing waste management infrastructure in an age of fiscal austerity. And that is only half of the battle: Scotland’s real challenge is to create a “Zero waste society” in which all its stakeholders participate in making “Scotland plc” a sustainable entity through the efficient use of resources.
Vital to the success of the Zero Waste Plan are the proposed Zero Waste Regulations which will provide a legal framework driving the implementation of sustainable approaches to waste management. The recent enactment of the Waste Information (Scotland) Regulations 2010 provides a clear indication of the intention of Scotland’s lawmakers to require the business sector to embrace sustainability. Scotland’s Zero Waste Plan was rolled out with little fanfare or hype, but its potential consequences for the way Scottish businesses currently operate are yet to be understood by Scottish CEOs and business leaders.
Six steps to “Zero Waste” Prevention

This is the cornerstone of Scotland’s approach to Zero Waste. Prevention includes any steps taken before a substance or material becomes waste, such as reducing the quantity of waste, product life span extensions, improved packaging and environmental and safety impact mitigation.

Re-use
This is the process of using products again for the same purposes for which they were initially designed.

Preparing for re-use
The cleaning and treatment of waste so that it can be re-used without further processing.


Recycling
Converting waste materials into products or substances for commercial or industrial use.



Recovery
Use of waste material as a substitute for other primary resources e.g. energy from waste schemes.



Disposal
Processing options which do not include the recovery of waste materials.



Waste Hierarchy Model, from the European Union Waste Directive 2008/98/EC

Waste hierarchy model

Prevention


• Implementation of Clean Technology, Eco-design and Best Available Techniques (BAT)

• Development of pertinent indicators, promotion of ISO 14001 and waste awareness programmes


Re-use
• Improve product durability

•Encourage the use of non disposable product alternatives

Preparing for reuse
•Development of reuse and repair networks


Recycling

•Implementation of carbon metrics and optimising the collection of recyclate (material that is capable of being recycled)

• Mandatory sorting of waste by commercial and industrial organisations

Recovery

• Institution of landfill bans for unsorted waste and restrictions on waste that is incinerated

• 25 per cent cap on local authority waste used for waste to energy schemes

Disposal

•Landfill reduction targets